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THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, OTHER
THAN RAILROADS, BY STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMISSIONS
The establishment, by the various states, of public service
commissions grew out of a chaos of public utility regulation
that was too deep-rooted to be eradicated by any policy which
stopped short of thorough-going administrative control. Experience had demonstrated that competition could not be trusted to
solve the problem of public utility rates; that regulation by
direct action of the legislature was arbitrary and inadequate;
that municipalities were not generally equipped to safeguard
either the rate payers or the corporation; and that local franchise contracts were unjustly discriminatory. Thus, the states
began to take upon themselves, thru state commissions, the
obligation of protecting both the utility companies and the
consumers.
The first commissions, established from 1844 to 1870, had a
very limited jurisdiction with no control over rates, but merely
the power to oversee railroad construction and operation. From
1860 to 1890 the Granger laws in the various states fixed maximum rates for freight and passenger service; from 1890 to 1902
the jurisdiction of the railroad commissions was extended to
include certain technical matters and an increased power over
railroad rates, providing a somewhat broader control in place
of the arbitrary maximum standards fixed by the Granger laws.
From 1902 to 1907 the tendency became manifest to extend the
jurisdiction of the state commissions to utilities other than railroads. Since 1907 the authority and jurisdiction of the state
commissions has been gradually extended to cover railroads and
other public utilities. At the present time there are public
service commissions in each of the forty-eight states, with the
exception of Delaware, and in the District of Columbia. The
spread of regulation by state commissions was rapid because it
was based on scientific principles, and for the reason that, in
practice, it resulted in the establishment of uniform accounting,
reduction of rates, elimination of unjust discrimination, and the
establishment of proper standards of service. In short, the
commission system was accepted as the best agency for administering a general regulatory statute.
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The modern period of state regulation may be said to have
begun in 1907. In that year Wisconsin extended the jurisdiction of its commission to water, light, power, telephone, and telegraph companies; in New York the power to regulate was
extended to cover gas and electric companies; and the jurisdiction of the Georgia commission was enlarged to include
telephone, telegraph, gas, and electric companies. Coupled with
the early records of the first commissions, the argument in favor
of centralizing the public control of utilities in an administrative
state commission was so compelling that the example was rapidly
followed in other states, thru the creation of new state bodies, or
the enlargement of the powers of the existing railroad commissions. Thus, commission regulation gradually superseded the
troublesome method of direct negotiation between municipalities
and local utilities, or the more laborious machinery of state
legislative action in each specific case, and at the same time provided an agency clothed with power to regulate and supervise
those utilities whose natural expansion resulted in th.pir operating in more than one local jurisdiction. So, the present public
service commissions were established because of the total or
partial failure of the older forms of regulation, and this agency
was deemed the best means for intelligent, prompt, and effective
control of companies engaged in rendering a public service.
Aside from the aforestated reasons for the establishment of
utility commissions there are others that have arisen from the
expansion of utility companies and the many technical questions
that are the outgrowth of such expansion and regulation. Many
municipal public utilities are becoming interurban in their
scope and are no longer local to the particular municipality
whose jurisdiction accordingly is not sufficiently comprehensive
to provide the necessary regulation and control. Each municipal corporation is necessarily limited to its own territory so
that the only method by which to secure uniform regulation
would be at the hands of a state public utility commission.
Likewise utility commission being created to perform the important function of supervising and regulating the business of
public service corporations it is necessary that the personnel of
such a commission be composed of a trained body of experts
who are unbiased, and who may dispose of all questions in the
exercise of their trained and best judgments.

REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the general
laws, which provide for the establishment of commissions, is
that they view the regulation of utilities as one upon which
continuous attention must be bestowed. Instead of periodic
adjustments of rates, by means of special contracts or legislative
acts, the present laws set up conditions which are to be continuously operative. Also instead of prescribing a specific rate
for each public utility, previously the case, the statute merely
lays down a general standard. This does not mean that specific
rates and service regulations are not fixed; it merely means that
they are not fixed by the statute, but are instead promulgated
by administrative order of the commissions. The new system
adopted the common law rule of reasonableness and declared it
to be the legislative standard. The central problem with which
these legislative standards deal has two aspects which generally
are the basis of every utility act: (1) the furnishing of reasonably adequate service and facilities; (2) the collection of a
charge, for every service rendered, which is reasonable and just.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, in general terms,
the regulation of public utilities, other than railroads, by state
administrative commissions, and the benefits that accompany
such a form of regulation. There have been several phases of
regulation, relating to public service corporations, that have been
outstanding in the regulation of public utilities, and which will
be discussed briefly in their respective order.
The development of the public regulation of securities has
been the outstanding event in the recent history of public utility
finance. The peculiarly American vice of looking for immediate
returns and large profits by unloading securities upon the public
was in marked evidence in the promotion of utility enterprises
prior to state regulation. One of the chief aims of security regulation, from the popular standpoint, was to protect consumers
by putting an end to overcapitalization and stock watering.
Another purpose of such regulation was to preserve public
utility credit, for the uncontrolled issue of public utility securities reacted both upon the credit and the service of the corporation. When such securities are issued to an inflated amount, one
of two things must happen: either dividends must be paid at the
expense of the proper maintenance of the utility facilities and as
a result interfere with the necessary maintenance and depreci-
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ation reserves, or the corporation must fail to pay any adequate
return upon the securities so issued, which would destroy its
credit. The deplorable financial condition of many utility companies emphasized the necessity for effective supervision and
regulation over securities. Massachusetts merits recognition as
the first state to seriously undertake the task of publicly controlling capitalization.
There are two leading views as to the proper method of
regulating public utility security issues. One is that there should
be absolute governmental control. Absolute control means the
issuance of securities only upon the authorization of the commission based upon a statement of the amount and character of the
issue desired, and its purpose together with a full report of the
assets and liabilities of the company. Under this plan the commission sets a date for a hearing and investigates the application,
and, if the issue is authorized, fixes the amount of the issue, the
price for which it is to be sold, the purpose of the sale, the conditions under which they are to be issued, and makes any other
requirements that are deemed essential. Modified governmental
control is merely a publicity policy. The utility is required to
furnish the commission with a detailed statement of the amount
of the issue and the purpose for which the proceeds are to be
used. This must be followed later by an accounting and a full
statement to the stockholders.
Absolute control of the securities, by the commission, is the
more favored policy. However it has been declared that the
control of public utility securities was not designed to make the
commissions the financial managers of the corporation, or to
empower them to substitute their judgment for that of the board
of directors or stockholders of the corporation as to the wisdom
of a transaction; it was designed to make the commissions the
guardians of the public by enabling them to prevent the issue of
stocks and bonds and for other than necessary purposes.' It
may be said that where a public service commission has the
power to hear and determine the facts in relation to a proposed
issue of securities, the action of the commission is compulsory if
1

People, ex rel. Delaware and H. Co., v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1, 90

N. E. 60; Kansas City, Etc., v. Bristow, 101 Kan. 557, 167 Pac. 1138,
P.U.R. 1918A; Re Peoples Telephone Co. (Neb.), P.U.R. 1915D, 160; Re

Farmers, Etc., Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1915B, 55; Springfield Gas and
Elec. Co. case, 291 Il1. 209, 125 N. E. 891.
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it finds the existence of facts showing the necessity for the
2
issuance of such securities.
The constitutional power of a state to delegate to commissions the determinations of the facts upon which public service
commissions may be permitted to issue securities, with authority
to approve or deny an application for such an issuance, dependent upon the commission findings as to whether the purpose or
other conditions are such as are prescribed by law, is well
3
settled.
At the present time there are twenty-three state commissions who are empowered to regulate, in some manner, the
issuance of securities by electric and gas companies, and the
capitalization of them ;4 there are two additional states who have
limited authority in the matter. 5 However, these laws regulating
the issuance of securities of public utilities are divergent in
many respects and it is practically impossible to interpret any
uniform law of supervision due to the existing disparity now
employed by the various commissions. Under subsection D of
section 883e-3, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, the
Kentucky Securities Law is not operative, provided, the public
service corporation "is subject to regulation or supervision as
to its rates and charges or as to the issue of its own securities
and those guaranteed by it by a public commission, board or
officer of the government of the United States, or of any state,
territory, or insular possession thereof, or of any municipality
located therein, or of the District of Columbia, or of the
Dominion of Canada, or any province thereof;

.

.

." Also,

"Securities appearing in any list of securities dealt in on the
New York Stock Exchange or any other recognized and responsible stock exchange which has been previously approved by the
commissioner and which securities have been so listed pursuant
to official authorization by such exchange

.

.

.

; provided,

-FallRiver Gas Co. v. Board of Light Con., 214 Mass. 529; State
v. Great Arorthern R. Co., 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289; Public Service
Con. v. State, 184 Ind. 273, 11 N. E. 10; Kansas City v. Bristow, supra;
Public Service Conm. v. Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137 N. E. 705; Ala.

Public Service Con. v. Mobile Gas Co. (Ala), 104 So. 538, 41 A. L. R.
872, and note.

3Alg. Public Service Con. v. Mobile Gas Co., supra.
'Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
5Pennsylvania and Virginia.
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the commissioner may at any time for cause withdraw the
exemption allowed by this section from any security dealt in on
any stock exchange herein mentioned or referred to." The last
exemption named is provided by section 883e-3, subsection F, of
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition. It is a prevalent
belief of patrons of public utilities that the books of these companies may be juggled, so to speak, so as to conceal real profits
and deceive the public as to the actual financial status and needs
of the utilities. One of the great services that the commissions
have rendered to the patrons of the utilities, as well as to the
companies, has been the establishment of uniform accounting
systems on a scientific basis, designed to show all of the facts
necessary for the patrons and companies to know about the
business.
The modern commission statutes give the commissions a
discretionary power to regulate accounts and to prescribe
accounting practices, as well as authority to enter on the
premises of the utilities for the purpose of inspecting the companies' books and records. The importance of adequate and
uniform accounting regulations may be easily recognized. Such
regulation gives needed publicity of the financial transactions
and operations of the company. It gives the investor, for the
first time, reliable information in relation to the current affairs
of the company, and furnishes the public and the commission
with data needed to fairly judge the public relations of the
utility.
The prime requisite of a proper accounting system is that
it shall furnish the necessary facts for a correct analysis of the
business. The primary purpose is to set forth the sources,
utilization, and disposition of pecuniary values. There must
be neither an inflation of the capital account, nor the creation
of secret reserves. The fixing of reasonable rates is one of the
principal functions of a public service commission. The reasonableness of rates is dependent upon the reasonableness of the
return they produce. In determining the rate one of the paramount factors to be observed is the actual investment. By
actual investment is meant the sacrifice or investment of the
owners of the property, and not an investment of money derived
from the rate payers. Therefore, if the books of the company
are to furnish reliable information, they must be kept in an
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accurate fashion. Additions and improvements must not be
charged to operating expenses, nor should the cost of replacements be added to the capital account. Thus, to correctly
determine the investment, accuracy of accounting is necessary.
After the reasonableness of the rate is determined it is
necessary to ascertain what portion of the return is to be
obtained from the various classes of consumers, and this can be
learned only after a careful analysis of the cost of each class of
service. It is desirable that each class should produce its fair
proportion of the return in order that there be no discrimination. Regulation of accounting is therefore vital to the
determination not only of the reasonableness of the rate as a
whole, but as to the fairness of charges for different branches
and classes of service.
The uniformity required is also a valuable feature of commission regulation of accounts, since it furnishes a basis of
comparison from which the relative efficiency of a corporation
may be determined. If the costs of a particular utility are
running higher than the average costs of other utilities similarly
situated, the reason for this can be inquired into. Another
advantage of such regulation, once its purpose and scope is
understood, will be its tendency to promote a better relationship
and an extended degree of confidence between the utility and
the public. Also accounting systems may be used, aside from
regulation, to serve as a basis for budgetary control, and for the
administration of tax laws.
If a state commission is to successfully perform its duties in
prescribing reasonable rates, preventing unjust discrimination
and insuring financial stability of the utility, it must be informed of the business of the operating company by a system of
accounting which will not permit the possible concealment of
forbidden yractices in accounts. The object of requiring such
accounts to be kept in a uniform way and open to the inspection
of the commission, is to enable it to be informed of the business
methods of the corporation, that it may properly regulate such
matters as are pertinent to its jurisdiction. 6
Laws have been enacted in thirty-four states authorizing
the commissions to regulate the accounting practices of pri-

'Kansas City Southern R. Go. v. U. S., 231 U. S. 423, 58 L. Ed. 296;
Interstate Commerce Comrnission v. Goodric Transit Co., 244 U. S. 194.

KnNTucKy LAw JOuRxAL

vately owned electric and gas companies.7 The statutes of thirtyone states require electric and gas companies to make general
reports, and, in such cases as the commission may deem necessary, special reports. The statutes in twenty-nine of the thirtyfour states are practically uniform in that the state commissions
are required to conform to the classification of accounts prescribed in the "Uniform Classification of Accounts" adopted by
the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners.
Under section 201e, 15, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, the Railroad Commission requires telephone, telegraph, and
natural gas companies to submit a "full and true statement" of
the affairs of the company on or before the first day of September
of each year.
Under the common law those engaged in public callings
were required to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities. Statutory regulations have superseded the common law
and, taken over that legal standard; also, regulatory provisions
relating to specific matters of service have been enacted. Administrative commissions are charged with enforcing specific legislative requirements, and are given a discretion only in regard to
the application of the general standard. The general and special
provisions of these statutes, relating to public utility service,
gives the commission complete power over the subject. Service
and rates are very closely related. Commissions have the power
to require adequate service only in case of a proper return; it
cannot, under the guise of regulation, require a utility to expend
large sums of mbney for the extension of its service into a new
territory -when the necessary result would be for the corporation
to use its property for public convenience without just compensation. 8 This is plainly a sound view of the interrelation of
service and rate questions. The provisions of the statutes giving
the commissions such extensive powers over public utility service
must be harmonized with those providing for a reasonable
return. The statutes cannot, or should not, be applied in the
7A!abama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, Georgia.
11apulpa v. SapuZpa Electrio R. Co., P.U.R. 1918D, 529; People of
N. Y., Etc., v. Public Service Commission, 269 U. S. 244, 70 L. Ed. 255;
Norfolk and W. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Corn., 265 U. S. 70, 68 L. Ed. 905.
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absence of such a return. However, when the return is sufficient
9
These
the power to compel adequate service is undoubted.
statutes are not intended to hamper the utilities, and, aside from
the general standards, the corporations are free to make their
own rules and regulations subject to the power of the commission
to change or modify them.' 0 As regards extensions, the power
of the commission in proper cases is unquestioned. In many
cases such power of regulation is specifically conferred by
statute." But, even in the absence of specific mention of extensions in the statutes, it seems that such authority is conferred by
the general provisions of the law which gives to the commissions
power to require adequate service and rates. Altho the commissions have considerable latitude over utility extensions of service,
their authority over the subject is not arbitrary. Only such
extensions may be required as are reasonably necessary. Mlost
of the controversies which have arisen have been over the reasonableness of the demand for the service under the conditions
presented in the various cases. 1 2 The courts have no authority
to substitute their judgment for that of the commission as to
what is reasonable in a given case, but are limited to determining
whether the action complained of was arbitrary or capricious,
3
and therefore unlawful.'
The enactments in the various states, giving the commissions
power to regulate and define service standards to be observed by
the utilities, are notably uniform. All but five states have the
authority to control electric and gas services, 14 altho the control
in three states does not extend to both types of service. 15
There is no duty imposed on the various state regulatory
commissions more important than that of fixing reasonable
"Pub. Serv. Com. v. Pudget Sound Traction, Etc., R. Co. (Wash.),
P.U.R. 19153, 799; Pub. Serv. Com. v. Nevada Northern R. Co.
(Nevada), P.U.R. 1919F, 334.
11B. & 0. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com. (W. Va.), P.U.R. 1918 B, 608,
94 S. E. 545.
"Cabrillo Club v. Atchison, Etc., R. Co. (Cal.), P.U.R. 1916A, 102;
Scranton v. Scranton R. Co. (Pa.), P.U.R. 1915C, 890.
' -Churchill v. Winthrop & W. Light & P. Co. (Me.), P.U.R. 1916F,
752; Re Pleasantville Gas Co. (N. J.), P.U.R. 1920 E, 404; Re Y. Y. and
Q. Gas Co. (N. Y.), P.U.R. 1915B, 821; Scottdale v. Citizens Water Co.
(Pa.), P.U.R. 1920D, 292; Re New Richmond (Wis.), P.U.R. 1915B, 243.
"People ex rel. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 62 L. Ed. 337; Brooklyn
R. Co. v. Straus, 245 Fed. 132.
Heights
11 Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, and South Dakota have no
control over service.
OKentucky and Texas have control over the service of natural gas.
Nebraska may prescribe service standards for electricity.
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charges. The regulation of public utilities received its orientation from the fact that rate problems were the first to engage the
attention of the public authorities. Every phase of utility regulation is, in some manner, closely related to the rate charge. The
power to regulate rates inherently rests in the state and is
strictly a legislative function. It has hereinbefore been stated
that the legislature has neither the time nor the facilities to
investigate matters pertaining to rate making, and the establishment of commissions was considered the most appropriate
and beneficial method by which particular rates may be prescribed and maintained. Since the famous case of Munn v.
Illinois was decided on March 1, 1877,15a wherein it was held
that private property devoted to a public use is subject to public
regulation, it has since been continuously recognized that rate
making is a legislative function to be exercised by the legislature
or its agent.' 6
Practically every regulatory statute provides that the
charge for service shall be just and reasonable and no higher
than allowed by law or order of the commission, and prohibits
every unlawful or unreasonable charge which is in excess of that
allowed by law or order of the commission. The administrative
body may investigate the reasonableness of rates either upon its
own motion or upon complaint, and if the rates so investigated
are found to be unjust, new rates may be prescribed. 17 The fact
that a commission is given the power to fix just and reasonable
rates makes it very plain that the commission has the authority
to increase, as well as decrease, rates.' s
From a broad viewpoint the power given to the commission
was not delegated for the purpose of protecting any one person
or another, but primarily to secure justice. In fixing the rates
the commission, as the agent of the state, acts in a legislative
capacity; in determining the reasonableness of rates it is a fact
finding body, and to that extent quasi-judicial in determining
the issue from the evidence. It may be said that the commission
should see: First, that the patrons get what they pay for;
25a
94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
'"8 KnoxviZle v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 371;

Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165, 66 L. Ed. 538; Bluefield
Water Works, Etc., Co. v. Pub. Serv. Cora., 262 U. S. 679, 67 L. Ed. 1176.
"'ReBronx Gas and Elec. Co., P.U.R. 1918D, 300, 320.
2'PeoplZe. Etc., D. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Cor., 156 N. Y. S. 1065 P.U.R.
1916E, 243; affirmed in 218 N. Y. 643, 112 N. E. 1071.
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Second, that the public pays for what it gets; and Third, that
the policy pursued by the regulatory body be such as to assure
at all times the improvement and development of such utility
enterprises as will meet the public need for public utility
service.' 9
It is to be remembered that the rate making power is based
on the police power of the state. 20 The use of the police power
by the legislature or its legally delegated agency, the regulatory
body, is limited by the Constitution of the United States and
the constitution of the state in which it functions. Thus, a
regulatory rate order is of the same effect as a legislative enactment and is subject to the same limitations. All regulatory rate
orders which transcend the limitations of either the state or Federal constitutions are void. Applying the guaranties afforded
by the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
has declared a number of limitations on the power of regulatory
bodies, in rate-making, which must be respected. The fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution, thru the "due process"
and "equal protection of the laws" clauses, provides the most
21
important limitations of state legislative power.
When the laws establishing the commissions were first
enacted, there were certain maximum rates prescribed by statute
which were not expressly repealed; there were also many franchises and other contracts in existence. Thus, the question soon
arose as to how far the commission's authority extended in the
face of these general rate laws and franchise contracts. As
regards the maximum rate laws, there are two principle ques-

tions: First, do the maximum rate laws prohibit the commission
from reducing rates below the level fixed in the acts! There
would seem to be little room for doubt as to the commission's
authority to do this, but the question has been raised. The
decisions seem to be uniform in upholding the commission's
"Re Bronx Gas and Electric Co., supra.

-0Union Dry Goods Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Cor., 248 U. S. 372,
63 L. Ed. 309.
=Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. Ed. 1511; Missouri, ex
rel. Telephone Co., Case, 262 U. S. 276, 67 L. Ed. 891; Indianapolis
Water Co. Case, 272 U. S. 400, 71 L. Ed. 316; Ohio Utilities Co. Case,
267 U. S. 359, 69 L. Ed. 656; N. Y. Telephone Co. Case, 271 U. S. 23,
70 L. Ed. 808; Wichita R. d L. Go. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 260 U. S. 48,
67 L. Ed. 124.
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power to reduce rates regardless of the maximum rate laws.
The second question, and the more important of the two, is
whether or not the enactment of commission laws repeal by
implication the maximum rate statutes, so that the commission
may have a free hand in prescribing reasonable rates. There is
a seeming conflict of authority on this issue which may be partly
reconciled by the difference in the various state statutes. The
weight of authority seems to be of the view that when the commission is established, the maximum rate laws are impliedly
repealed.2 3 There is considerable authority, however, to the
effect that the commissions are bound by the maximum rate
24
statutes.

The greatest controversy in recent years has been over those
contracts in which rates were fixed by franchise and, upon
acceptance by the utility, became binding agreements between
the municipality and the public service corporation. It may be
stated as axiomatic that the police power is inherent in the
sovereign; that the regulation of utility rates comes from within
that power; and that its exercise may be by the state or its
lawfully delegated agencies. A state may authorize a municipality by agreement to establish public utility service rates and
thereby suspend for a term of years, not grossly excessive, the
exertion of governmental action to fix compensation to be paid
for the services rendered by public service corporations. 25 The
law is also uniform in sustaining the view that the Courts may
2People, ex rel. D. & H. Co., v. Pub. Serv. Com., 125 N. Y. S. 1000;
Re Rochester (N. Y.), P.U.R. 1915A, 1095; State Pub. UtiL. Corn. v.
Mitchell, Etc., R. Co., 275 Ill. 555, 114 N. E. 325, P.U.R. 1917B, 1046.
=Re Portland R. Light and P. Co. (Ore.), P.U.R. 1918A, 751;
Oklahoma City v. Corporation Commission (Okla.), P.U.R. 19210, 801;
State, ex rel. Rhodes, v. Pub. Serv. Gom. (Mo.), P.U.R. 1917E, 315;
Robertson v. Wilmington and P. T. Co., P.U.R. 1919B, 129, 139; State,
ex rel. Pub. Serv. Corn.. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 76 W. Va. 399; Re Huntington
Railroad Co. (N. Y.), P.U.R. 1918A, 249; Board of Survey of Arlington
v. Bay State R. Co., 224 Mass. 463, 113 N. E. 273; State, ex rel. v. Pub.
Serv. Corn., 259 Mo. 704, 168 S. W. 1156.
2' Re Northern Pac. R. Co. (Mont.), P.U.R. 1920F, 11, 15; Re W.
Passenger Ass. (Mont.), P.U.R. 1920F, 715; Re Railroads, (Neb.),
P.U.R. 1920F, 17; State Pub. Util. Coin. v. Mitchell, Etc., R. Co., P.U.R.
1917B, 1046, supra.
2 Columbus R. and P. Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 63 L. Ed.
699, P.U.R. 1919D, 239; Ga. R. and P. Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432,
67 L. Ed. 1065; Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co., 265 U. S. 215, 68 L. Ed.
685; St. Cloud Pub. Serv. Corn. v. St. Cloud, 265 U. S. 352, 68 L. Ed.
1050; Southern U. Co. v. Palatka, 268 U. S. 232, 69 L. Ed. 931; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Gilchrist, 279 U. S. 159, 73 L. Ed. 652;
Ky. Power and Light Co. v. Maysville (Ky.), 36 Fed. (2nd) 816.
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not relieve a public utility, bound by a franchise to render
service for fixed amounts, from the obligation to serve at the
agreed rates however inadequate they may prove to be.26 In the
absence of an inviolable contract, the power of the state in its
sovereign capacity to regulate the rates of public service corporations upon the application of the utility involved, thru its commission or otherwise, to increase the rates fixed by contract, in
whatever form such contract has been entered into franchise or
otherwise, has been settled beyond dispute. This rule is predicated on the ground that a contract of this kind imposes no
restriction on the sovereign power of the state to fix just and
reasonable rates as changing conditions may make desirable. It
is a contract subject to the states sovereign power over rates,
and when the state, thru its public utility commission, exercises
its sovereign power over such charges the contract rights of the
parties must yield. It is seemingly an attribute of sovereignty
which cannot be contracted away, and in contemplation of
which all contracts or agreements are made. It has, also, been
legally settled that the constitutional prohibitions against the
impairment of contract obligations which proteet private contracts concerning property rights do not go to contracts touching
governmental functions, for no obligation of contract can be
27
extended to defeat legitimate governmental power.
The amount of the rates to be charged by utility companies,
other than railroads, in the state of Kentucky, with few exceptions is fixed altogether by franchise contracts between the
municipal corporations and the public service corporations. A
part of section 201, El, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, relating to the duties of the Railroad Commission, expressly
states:
0 Denney v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 276 U. S. 97, 72 L. Ed. 483;
Henderson Water Co. v. CorporationCommittee, 269 U. S. 273, 70 L. Ed.
273; R. Com. of Cal. v. Los Angeles Ry. Com., 280 U. S. 145, 74 L. Ed.
234; Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U. S. 539, 65 L.-Ed.
764; San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Com., 255 U. S. 547;
65 L. Ed. 777; Columbus R. P. and L. Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 349,
63 L. Ed. 669; Paducah v. Paducah Railway Co., 261 U. S. 267,
67 L. Ed. 647,
'Leiper v. Baltimore, Etc., R. Co., 262 Pa. 328: 105 AtI. 551, P.U.R.
1919C, 397; State, ex rel. Billings, v. Billings Gas Co., 55 Mont. 102,
173 Pae. 799, P.U.R. 1918F, 768; Ansonia v. Ansonia 'Water Co., 101
Conn. 151, 125 Atl. 474; People, ex rel., v. Pub. Serv. Com., 225 N. Y.
216: 121 N. E. 777: P.U.R. 1919C, 374; Richmond v. Virginia R. and P.
Co., 141 Va. 69, 126 S. E. 353; also see authorities supra.
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"The provisions of this act shall not embrace the operation of
telephone companies within any city where the rates charged for the
transmission of messages and any other service may be regulated by
local authority, or the operation of natural gas companies in any city
where the rates are now or may be regulated by local authority;
• . . nor shall the provisions of this act apply to any telephone or
gas company operating in any municipality inder a franchise or contract fixing or regulating the rates which said company may charge,
or the terms and conditions under which said company is operating."

In an unbroken line of decisions the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has held that no franchise to conduct business and
occupy the streets and public ways of a municipality of this
Commonwealth can be acquired in

any other way than by a

strict compliance with sections 163 and 164 of the Kentucky
Constitution. There must be a public advertisement of bids; the
bids must be received publicly; the franchise must be awarded
to the highest and best bidder, and cannot be granted for a
period in excess of 20 years, and upon the expiration of the life

of the franchise the owner thereof has no longer the right to
occupy and use the public ways of the municipality, and can
acquire no such right, nor can the city grant any such right,

except that a new sale is affected under the provisions of sections
28
163 and 164 of the Constitution.
Section 164 of said Constitution prescribes certain conditions upon which

a

municipality is

authorized to grant a

franchise, or privilege, which is limited to a term not exceeding
twenty years.

Section 163 requires the municipality's consent

as a prerequisite to the use or the obstruction of the public
streets or grounds by certain designated public utilities, mainly

gas, telephone, telegraph, water and electric light companies. It
will be observed that in vesting a municipal corporation with
the sole power to grant a public utility franchise, within its
limits, there is no restriction of terms except duration of time.
It has been held by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that these

provisions are self-operative and confer upon the municipalities
authority to grant franchises to those specified utilities over
"Rural Home Tel. Co. v. Indevendent Tel. Co., 128 Ky. 209, 107
S. W. 787;Princeton v. Princeton E. Light and P. Co., 166 Ky. 730;
179 S. W. 1074; City of Somerset v. Smith, 105 Ky. 678, 49 S. W. 456;
Peoples Elec. Light & P. Co. v. Capitol Gas Co., 116 Ky. 77, 75 S. W. 280;
Hamilton v. Bastin Bros., 188 Ky. 764, 224 S. W. 430; East Tenn. Tel.
Co. v. Anderson County, 115 Ky. 488, 74 S. W. 218; Norris v. Ky. State
Tel. Co.. 235 Ky. 234, 30 S. W. (2d) 960.
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which they are given supervision. 29 The constitutional delegation of such power to the municipal corporations forbids the
Commonwealth from regulating those utilities, operating in
municipalities, through a State regulatory body functioning
pursuant to a State public service law. Thus, a public service
corporation may transact business in this Commonwealth only
by complying with sections 163 and 164 of the Constitution, and
which subjects them to control and supervision of the municipal
authorities within whose limits their business is carried on.
The question has arisen as to whether or not the Railroad
Commission may compel a utility company to continue service
on a reasonable basis after the franchise has expired. Section
201e-23, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, prescribes
that if a public utility, after the-expiration of its franchise in
any city, continues in its business without obtaining a new
franchise, it shall be subject to the jurisdiction and authority of
the Railroad Commission, and shall not withdraw its service
without first obtaining permission of the Commission so long as
it remains in business in this Commonwealth or any part thereof.
Under this section of the statute it has been argued that a public
utility, over which the Railroad Commission has control, may be
compelled to furnish service after the franchise has expired.
However, that section has' been construed to mean that any public
service corporation which has voluntarily continued its service
after the expiration of the franchise to be under the jurisdiction
of the Railroad Commission. 30 On the other hand it has been
held that all obligations on the part of the utility company to
furnish service terminates upon the expiration of the franchise.
This ruling may be distinguished from that in the United FueL
case, supra, for in that case the United Fuel Company voluntarily continued to serve the municipality for a period of five
years after the expiration of the franchise, and it is true that
when a utility voluntarily renders service after the franchise has
expired it is brought within section 201e-23, supra, and thus
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. The
"Tri-State Ferry Co. v. Birney, 235 Ky. 540, 31 S. -W. (2nd) 932;
Russel v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 231 Ky. 811, 22 S. W. (2nd) 288;
ITrvine Toll Bridge Co. v. Estill County, 210 Ky. 170, 275 S. W. 634;
also see: Home Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. Ed.
176; and 6 R. C. L., page 168, section 168.
" United Fuel Co. v. Railroad Com. of Ky., 278 U. S. 300, 73 L.
Ed. 290.
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rule that the Commission cannot require a utility to continue in
operation arises when there is an involuntary continuation of
service, as under mandatory orders of a court. 31
A recent provision added to some of the statutory enactments covering the regulation of public utilities is the "indeterminate permit." This is nothing more than an unlimited
franchise, which may be terminated by municipal purchase or
by law for mis-user or non-user. Experience has shown that
term franchises are unsatisfactory to the utilities, investors and
consumers alike. Utility franchise contracts which are limited
in years of existence should be amortized in such a manner as to
return the money invested at the termination of the franchise,
yet rates must not exceed the amount necessary to yield a proper
return and such a rate is not sufficient to. amortize the investment. Furthermore, the plant cannot be scrapped at the end of
the franchise period; the public must still be served, and so
there is really no economic reason for amortizing the investment.
Also the grantees of franchises must trust in their ability to
secure renewals at the end of the franchise period, and many
times political manipulations, that attend local politics, stand in
the way of such a renewal. The perpetual franchise is objectionable because it stands in the way of service improvements,
and in case of abuse the public has no recourse. Likewise, the
rates being fixed by contract there is no provision for flexible
accommodation to changing economic conditions. The indeterminate franchise, or permit, strikes a middle course between the
term franchise and the perpetual franchise.
The indeterminate permit offers a satisfactory alternative
in that it recognizes the monopoly character of the business,
removes the need for amortization funds, provides for flexible
accommodation in rates and service to changes in economic conditions, gives the municipality an option to purchase at a fair
price, and protects the exclusive nature of the grant by requiring
potential competition to secure a certificate of necessity and
convenience from the state regulatory commission. The real
difference between the new grant and the old one is that under
the indeterminate permit the monopolistic feature may be
11Union Light, Heat, and Power Go. v. Railroad Com. of Ky.,
17 Fed. (2nd) 143; Union Light, Heat, and Power Co. v. City of Ft.
Thomas, 215 Ky4 384, 285 S. W. 228; City of Ludlow v. Union Light,
Heat, and Power Co., 231 Ky. 813, 22 S. W. (2nd) 909.
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changed at any time by the commission, thru the issuance of a
certificate of convenience and necessity. In addition to this, the
utility under the new grant agrees that it will sell its property
at any time, upon reasonable notice, to the municipality without
the cumbersome condemnation procedure formerly necessary.
Thus, it may be said: First, that the indeterminate permit
recognizes the monopolistic character of public utilities and
prohibits the competition of new enterprises unless public convenience and necessity, as determined by the administrative
commission, requires another utility; and Second, the right to
operate and occupy the public streets is indeterminate, subject to
the right of the municipality to purchase at any time at a fair
price to be fixed by the administrative commission.
At the present time there are only a few states which have
specific enactments on indeterminate permits, but there is a
tendency toward its wider use. 32 The national government has
adopted the principle of the indeterminate permit and all public
service corporations in the District of Columbia operate under
franchises of that nature; all licenses issued to hydro-electric
companies under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 are based
on its underlying principles.
State regulation of public service corporations by state
regulatory commissions has become an established institution
which is destined to develop in scope and importance during the
next several decades. The development will invariably follow
the present gradual increase in the number and extent of public
utilities and the growing importance of their position in our
economic and social structure. Uniformity of regulation will, it
is believed, be reflected in decreased operating costs and
improved service.
Commission regulation no longer bears
aspects of experiment or novelty. There is now little dispute as
to the advantage of this type of regulation to the public and to
industry. The more important questions now involved concern
the extent and character of such regulation.
So far as the commissions are concerned the power of regulation is now generally accorded them. However, in many cases
"Wisconsin,

Indiana,

Illinois, Louisiana, and New York have

adopted such provisions. Ohio and California have indeterminate
permit laws which relate to street railways only. Also, see Uniform
Public Utilities Act, approved by the American Bar Association, sections 21 to 26 inclusive.
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such regulation is made ineffective by court decisions. If the
commissions are to be held responsible for the economic development of public utilities, and for the protection of public interest
in them, they must be free to adopt measures which, in their
opinion, are calculated to bring results. These administrative
standards should, of course, be subject to judicial review so that
private property may not be confiscated, and the initiative of
private management not be taken away. But, where the commission's action is not palpably confiscatory, the judiciary should
not substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to what
the administrative standards should be.
If the commissions are to work well, they must be more
adequately financed. If they are to to retain and develop an
effective personnel they must be able to bid for specialized talent
with the public utilities, offering careers in the public service
which will appeal to young men. The term of office of utility
commissioners should 'be of sufficient tenure and the salaries of a
sufficient amount to obtain the high type and thoroughly competent men whose decisions will receive the support to which
they are entitled. The importance of giving administrative
commissions an independent status, protected alike from the
undue interference and influnece of public utility officials and
politicians cannot be over-emphasized. Though their duties are
now more important and the reliance of the public upon them is
greater, the influences which pervert administrative agencies are
also stronger. Both public officials and the public utilities
should co-operate with, but not control, administrative commissions.
If the work of regulation is to be effectively done, it must
be in the hands of the mandatory type. In the development of
legislative policies the initiative should be taken by the commissions, for they are in closest touch with the problems. Criticisms,
investigations, and experimentation should be encouraged. At
the same time both the commissions and the utility corporations
should be protected from fallacious, insincere political attacks.
Nothing can be more suicidal than to have regulation settle down
to a complacent routine which contents itself with the mere
adjudication of differences.

Louis Cox.
Attorney-at-Law,
Frankfort, Kentucky.
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